The Great Migrations
As U.S. TikTok users move to Xiaohongshu, Chinese head home for Lunar New Year
Welcome back to What’s Happening in China, your weekly update on the latest news and developments from the country.
“TikTok refugees.” Even with TikTok facing an imminent U.S. ban, no one could’ve predicted that would be the talk of the town this week. Or ever. As U.S. users prepare for the shutdown of ByteDance’s embattled app, reportedly over 3 million TikTokers are protesting by migrating to Xiaohongshu (小红书, literally “little red book”)—China’s lifestyle-sharing platform, known internationally as RedNote—in what is likely to be a short-lived but delightful moment of cultural exchange.
How are these newcomers adapting to Chinese social media norms and content guidelines? What new interactions might emerge from this unexpected digital migration? How will Xiaohongshu handle the international spotlight and user surge? And how will Chinese regulators respond to the sudden influx of foreign users? While we’re already starting to get the answers to some of these questions, whether it lasts a week or a month, this episode is giving us a fascinating glimpse of what happens when digital cultures of geopolitical—ahem—competitors collide.
Thanks for reading.
Let’s jump in.
— PC
[Edited January 18, 2025: Updated user migration numbers from over half a million to over 3 million based on latest data.]
Keywords: TikTok ban • Xiaohongshu • Lunar New Year • travel rush • population decline • GDP growth • Trump’s inauguration • cybersecurity • Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act • AI chip export controls • Marco Rubio • Mike Waltz • Pete Hegseth • John Ratcliffe • Taiwan arms sales • US-China climate relations • Arctic • EU-China summit • Zheng Qinwen Australian Open 2025
Through the Lens
In Focus
I. “TikTok refugees”
“Hi Chinese netizens! I am American, if you need help with your English homework, please tell me!” Within a day, the 17-year-old had received nearly 2,000 comments.
Rios is among the thousands of “TikTok refugees” who have flocked to Xiaohongshu after TikTok influencers called for a migration to the app to show their opposition to the U.S. government’s crackdown on TikTok. The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to rule on a law that requires TikTok to be divested from its parent company ByteDance by January 19, or face a ban in the U.S.
Dubbed “RedNote” by TikTokers, Xiaohongshu, which had not previously targeted American users, was the most-downloaded app on Apple’s U.S. App Store as of Tuesday. For Rios, using the app is more than an act of rebellion, she told Rest of World.
“I just wanted something that could replace TikTok, and also it was sort of an act of protest against our government,” the Texan said.
Read: TikTok refugees flock to RedNote and connect with Chinese Xiaohongshu users (Rest of World)
Related:
TikTok says it will ‘go dark’ unless it gets clarity from Biden following Supreme Court ruling (AP)
Can Donald Trump circumvent a TikTok ban? (The Guardian)
Chinese officials reportedly discuss sale of TikTok in US to Elon Musk (The Guardian)
The Lure of Chinese App Red Note (TIME, by )
'TikTok Refugees' are learning Mandarin Chinese on Duolingo for RedNote (Engadget)
With All Eyes on TikTok, US Should Not Overlook WeChat (The Diplomat)
II. “Xi remains a prisoner of his own language.”
China’s economic recovery, long awaited after the Covid lockdowns, remains stubbornly elusive. Growth has stalled, consumer spending is muted, and confidence — both domestic and global — has frayed. The initial buzz created by policy pivots announced last September and reaffirmed at December’s Central Economic Work Conference has fizzled. The world’s second-largest economy feels stuck in second gear, unable to reclaim the momentum that once defined the “China speed.”
At first glance, the reasons seem clear: heavy-handed regulatory crackdowns, a fixation on supply-side investment, and a refusal to unleash meaningful fiscal support for households. But a deeper issue lies beyond these missteps. The heart of the problem is political. China’s economic malaise is a reflection of its governance, and in particular, the language used by Xi Jinping’s Communist Party and its structure. The very system that consolidated Xi’s power now acts as a drag, incapable of the agility needed in a time of crisis.
Directives from Beijing arrive swiftly, but the system falters where it matters most: execution. Communication within the bureaucracy is deeply asymmetrical. Orders flow downward in a torrent of dense, ideological language, leaving local officials scrambling to interpret Xi’s true priorities. Feedback from the ground up, meanwhile, is slow, fragmented, and distorted in a system that discourages honesty. Local officials, already crippled by debt and resource shortages, are preoccupied with studying ideology and attending political sessions, leaving little time — or capacity — for practical problem-solving. Even when they spot issues, they lack the language to express them in a hierarchy that rewards ideological loyalty over results. Paralyzed by contradictory demands — reduce debt, expand welfare, boost spending — and fearful of political missteps after years of anti-corruption purges, officials default to inaction. The result is a bureaucracy spinning its wheels, incapable of bridging the widening gap between lofty directives and ground-level realities. Beijing speaks to itself in an echo chamber, while the economy sputters under the weight of this fractured communication.
This communication breakdown isn’t merely a glitch in the bureaucratic system — it’s rooted in language itself. Marxist-Leninist philosophy, with its emphasis on dialectical materialism and the resolution of contradictions, forms the ideological backbone of the Party’s governance. In theory, it provides a framework for balancing competing priorities and navigating complexity. In practice, it often generates dense, impenetrable language that obscures intent. Xi has entrenched this style into a rigid dialect of governance, leaving both officials and markets struggling to decipher his true aims. The hallmark phrases of Xi Jinping Thought — contradictory by design — frequently confuse more than they clarify. Take the ubiquitous “既要…也要…” constructions: “we must both do this and that,” a quintessential expression of Marxist dialectics. This rhetorical style, while ideologically cohesive, leaves markets guessing and officials floundering. Does Beijing prioritize short-term consumption or long-term investment? Is property sector support a temporary fix or a fundamental shift? The answer, invariably, is “both.” This ambiguity doesn’t just cloud decision-making — it erodes the clarity and focus essential for driving economic recovery.
Read: How Xi Jinping Became a Prisoner of His Party’s Language (The Wire China)
III. Amb. Burns: “One of the tests of this relationship is, can we compete and yet do so in a way that doesn’t elevate the probability of a conflict between us?”
One of President Biden’s accomplishments of over the last four years is that the United States is in a stronger strategic position in the Indo-Pacific in this long-running competition with China. In large part, it’s because we’ve strengthened our alliances with those three countries and with Australia, we’ve created AUKUS, and the Quad now is meeting at the head of government level. I just had a Quad meeting yesterday here in Beijing with my Japanese, Australian, and Indian counterparts. We meet regularly and we are lined up together out here in Beijing. That wasn’t the case five or six years ago, but it’s the case now because of Chinese overreach.
There have been penalties here that the Chinese are very well aware of. One of my takeaways, as I conclude my time here in Beijing, is the allies of the United States in the Indo-Pacific are force multipliers for American power. Academically or politically, diplomatically, a lot of people just look at this competition between the U.S. and China and they try to size up the weight — economic, strategic, military — of the two countries and compare. That’s not a valid comparison on the U.S. side, because China has no allies to speak of. To measure strength, you’ve got to put the U.S. alongside Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and, in many ways, India.
For me as a diplomat, the most important thing we can do in this competition is to keep the allies close. I also say that as a former American ambassador to NATO — and I was there on 9/11. Let me name two countries that stood up on 9/11, and called me immediately in the aftermath of the strikes. The Canadian ambassador called me first and said, “Let’s invoke Article 5.” Then the Danish ambassador called me.
I am an alliance-centered American who believes that these allies are just precious strengths for America because they multiply our power. These are reliable countries that have been with us through thick and thin. As I walk away from this job, I’ve been working very closely with all those allied ambassadors here and we are better off for it. I really hope that the United States is going to remain true to those alliances because they’re in our self-interest.
Read: Amb. Burns Reflects from Beijing ( by )
Related: Trump’s Canada and Greenland Threats Imperil China Fight, Says Departing Envoy (WSJ)
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